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CIVIL RIGHTS
Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439
Plaintiff appeals from the district court's denial of his motion for a
new trial on the section 1981 claim because the jury's verdict was grossly
inadequate. Defendant appeals from the district court's judgment in
favor of the plaintiff on the Title VII claim, alleging that the district
court was bound by the jury's determination of damages, and yet the
court awarded damages in excess of that determination. Defendant also
appeals from the district court's denial of its motion to dismiss the Title
VII claim for untimely filing, and the plaintiff's section 1981 claim. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Plaintiff brought suit against his employer, Total Petroleum, charging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The charges arose out of the alleged unlawful termination of the
plaintiff in retaliation for plaintiff's assistance with an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claim brought by Mr. Skinner's
black co-worker. Plaintiff demanded a jury trial on his section 1981
claim. His Title VII claim was tried to the court. Thejury's findings are
binding on all common issues. Therefore, the district court erred in
awarding damages in excess of $40,000 when the jury awarded damages
of only $3,945.48. However, the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a new trial is also reversed because the jury's award of damages
was grossly inadequate and the result of jury compromise. This constituted an abuse of discretion on the part of the district court. Finally, the
decision of the district court to deny the defendant's motion to dismiss
is affirmed.
Huxall v. First State Bank, 842 F.2d 249
Appellee First State Bank had obtained a default judgment against
appellant Huxall in a debt action. Following a sheriff's sale of property
seized to satisfy the judgment, Huxall filed an action under § 1983 alleging that she had been deprived of her property without due process of
law.
The Tenth Circuit found that Huxall had chosen not to take advantage of the opportunities available to invoke the state judicial procedure
to protect her property; therefore, the facts did not support her claim.
Affirming the district court's order, the court held that Huxall's failure
to show a denial of due process was a proper basis for dismissing her
action for failure to state a claim under § 1983.
Harris v. Maynard, 843 F.2d 414
The parents of an inmate killed in an Oklahoma prison brought an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three Oklahoma corrections offi-
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cials. The officials appealed the district court's denial of their motion
for summary judgment and protection from discovery, invoking qualified immunity from liability.
The Tenth Circuit stated that prison officials are not immune from
suit for intentional wrongful conduct under the eighth amendment or
the fourteenth amendment due process clause. The court found that
the pleadings and affidavits fairly raise the possibility of a violation of a
clearly established right under the eighth amendment. The record
shows that the deceased plaintiff's mother had requested protection for
her son from other inmates, that a separation order had been issued but
ignored, and that access to evidence had been denied. The court held
that the unique facts warrant denial of the motions for summary judgment and protection from discovery.
Mitchell v. City of Sapulpa, 857 F.2d 713
Plaintiff appeals the granting of summary judgment by the district
court in favor of defendants pursuant to suit brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Plaintiff, a conceded fleeing felon, alleged that defendant used
deadly force, pursuant to a policy of defendant police chief and the City
of Sapulpa. Defendants base their action on Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 193
which in essence allows the officer to use all necessary means to effect
the arrest of a fleeing felon. This cause of action arose prior to the decision of Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), where the Supreme Court
held that the fourth amendment prohibits use of deadly force to arrest
apparently unarmed felons unless there is probable cause for belief the
suspect poses significant threat of death or serious injury to the officer
or others and is necessary to prevent escape. Specifically challenged in
this appeal is the district court's holding that Garner should not be applied retroactively.
The panel relied on the Supreme Court's three-prong Chevron Oil
test in determining when.a case should apply retroactively. Chevron Oil v.
Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). Additionally, the panel recognized the "clear
break" test of United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982), as the threshold test for making a decision. The panel held that while at times deterrence may be furthered by retroactive application, there was not such a
case since the municipality acted pursuant to a state statute on whose
legitimacy it had little reason to question. The panel also held that
although compensation to victims is one of the purposes of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, it is not the primary purpose and where, as here, there would be
compensation without any benefit from deterrence, retroactive application is unwarranted.
Since defendants relied on policies of police conduct which had
been long established, retroactive application would be inappropriate.
The panel also held the plaintiff lacked standing to have Oklahoma's
statute declared unconstitutional and further that plaintiff failed to
prove a case of excessive force under the "shocks the conscious" test.
Affirmed.
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Coen v. Runner, 854 F.2d 374
Plaintiff appeals the district court's granting of summary judgement
based on defendants' qualified immunity. The court also dismissed
plaintiff's pendant state claims since no valid action for 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claims existed. Affirmed.
Plaintiff's constitutional claims are threefold. He claims abridgement of his first, fourth, and fourteenth amendment rights. Additionally, plaintiff claims abrogation of a fifth amendment property right.
The panel held defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in defense of plaintiff's first, fourth, and fourteenth amendment claims since
defendants' actions were objectively reasonable. To avoid summary
judgment on his first amendment claim, plaintiff must with specificity
demonstrate factual allegations that the defendants' actions were guided
by impermissible motives, which he failed to do here. The panel also
upheld the district court's finding that plaintiff failed to establish a property right in his § 1983 claim based on freedom from libel (this to be
determined under Wyoming law) since, under that state's law, no property interest in freedom from libel exists. Lastly, the panel upheld the
district court's dismissal of plaintiff's pendant state claims.
Setliffv. Memorial Hospital of Sheridan, 850 F.2d 1384
Plaintiff appeals the granting of summary judgement on his first
amendment claim and also appeals dismissal of his numerous state
claims. Plaintiff alleges defendant hospital's investigation of his medical
practice and its ultimate decision that he obtain second opinions prior to
performing certain surgeries was retaliation for plaintiff's exercise of
protected first amendment speech. The Tenth Circuit found the record
contained plaintiff's mere conclusory allegations which are insufficient
to defeat a motion for summary judgement. Affirmed.
Plaintiff also alleges deprivation of due process regarding his hospital privileges. This court affirms the district court's finding that plaintiff
failed to demonstrate the existence of a recognized property right,
which the Tenth Circuit defined as an individual entitlement grounded
in state law. While plaintiff may have such a property interest, the facts
of this case establish that his privileges were not restricted nor modified
until after plaintiff had received a formal hearing. Therefore, plaintiff
suffered no deprivation of any property right without the requisite due
process. The Tenth Circuit also held that despite the fact that plaintiff's
reputation and attractiveness to their employers may have been diminished as a result of the hospital's investigation he had not been deprived
of a liberty interest. The court upheld the district court's exercise of
discretion in dismissal of the state law claims.
DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714
Plaintiff, lacking vision in one eye, was denied a position as inspector by a private employer on grounds that a regulation governing their
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federal contract specifically disqualified such persons from the position.
Plaintiff sued alleging a violation of his constitutional rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The lower court denied a motion for summary
judgment.
The Tenth Circuit held that a private contractor acting under federal law was accorded qualified immunity for civil rights violations.
When a private party acts in accordance with duties imposed by a governmental contract, performs a governmental function, and is sued
solely on the basis of those acts performed pursuant to the contract, it is
entitled to qualified immunity.
Procedurally, the court found that a private party acting solely pursuant to contractual duties and not in concert with government employees or pursuant to an unconstitutional law may bring an interlocutory
appeal from a denial of qualified immunity. Neither the fact that plaintiff
sought both legal and equitable relief from appellant nor the existence
of a factual dispute barred the interlocutory appeal.
Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603
Meyer appeals from an order of the district court preliminarily enjoining the Secretary of State of Colorado from conducting an election
on a proposed amendment to the state constitution initiated by members of the appellant Official English Committee. Reversed and
remanded.
Appellants circulated petitions printed exclusively in English
throughout counties designated as bilingual for purposes of the Voting
Rights Act (Act). As a result, the district court invalidated the petitions
by finding that the Voting Rights Act, which requires printed election
material to be bilingual, applies to initiative petitions. The injunction
thus ordered by the district court was reversed by this court on a
number of grounds. First, the statutory language of the Voting Rights
Act precludes inclusion of "petitions" as falling under its auspices since
"petitions" are not synonomous with the statutory terms of "voting"
and "electoral process." Therefore, the Act only applies to measures
already qualified for placement on the ballot, and not efforts taken to
initiate a measure for future placement on the ballot. Second, the view
of the Attorney General relied upon by the district court to support its
conclusion, was not authoritative since the administrative interpretation
resulted in a construction of the statute beyond its limits. And third, the
district court erred in qualifying this initiative action as "state action"
because the Colorado Constitution specifically reserves this right of initiative to the people.
Watson v. The City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690
Plaintiff filed a federal civil rights action against Kansas City, its police chief, and a number of officers claiming failure to provide protection
to a victim of domestic violence and her son. The district court granted
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defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals. To survive summary judgment, the plaintiff must go beyond her pleadings and
show evidence of specific facts demonstrating that it is the policy or custom of the defendants to provide less police protection to victims of domestic assault than to other assault victims. Since the plaintiff presented
sufficient evidence to support such a jury finding, this court overrules
the lower court's grant of summary judgment. To the extent plaintiff's
lawsuit asserted a claim of class-based discrimination based on sex, the
district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant is affirmed. Since the plaintiff failed to present any evidence that a policy
which discriminated against victims of domestic violence adversly affected women, she failed to state a prima facie case for sex-based
discrimination.
Facteau v. Sullivan, 843 F.2d 1318
Plaintiff brought a prison civil rights action, alleging poor conditions at the state prison. The district court dismissed the action, but
referred it to a special master due to an existing consent decree rendered in a pending class action suit that involved the conditions at the
same prison. The consent decree provided that an appointed special
master would review all collateral actions and dismiss those that would
be covered by the pending class action. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal and referral, holding that if the special master found that the
plaintiff's case did not fit within the class action suit, the plaintiff's action should be transferred back to the district court.
Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 861 F.2d 631
Appellant Phillips Petroleum closed its Kansas City refinery and entered into a closure agreement with a union whereby Phillips agreed to
consider qualified employees for employment at other refineries under a
bidding procedure. During this bidding procedure, appellee Anderson,
in his capacity as union president, filed age discrimination claims with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on behalf of
certain union members. Later, Anderson was not transferred to any of
the jobs on which he had bid. Alleging that Phillips had failed to transfer him as retaliation for his having filed the earlier age discrimination
claims, Anderson sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA). The district court found that Phillips had discriminated
against Anderson and had willfully violated the ADEA. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part.
The Tenth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to support
the claim of retaliation but insufficient to establish a willful violation of
the ADEA. A finding of "willfulness" requires evidence that age was the
predominant factor in the employer's decision. Because there was evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Phillips' failure to
transfer Anderson, Phillips' actions were not "willful."
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McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1249
Defendant appeals from a jury verdict granting damages to plaintiff
in a racially discriminatory discharge claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and
the district court's order reinstating plaintiff to his employment with
United. Affirmed.
McAlester, an employee at United, was summoned for jury duty but
was excused from duty for two days. He did not report for work either
of those days. After following the grievance procedures, plaintiff was
terminated. Plaintiff then filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to no avail and subsequently filed the present
complaint, asserting that United failed to apply its system of progressive
discipline to him as it does with white employees. First, United asserts
that the Railway Labor Act (RLA) precludes the district court's subject
matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's § 1981 claim. This court disagreed
and found that while courts have no jurisdiction to hear airline employee claims based solely upon a contract under the RLA, they do have
jurisdiction over claims based on federal statutes. Further, the RLA
does not repeal or preempt this § 1981 claim because the RLA cannot
be construed as irreconcilable with § 1981, nor does it cover the "whole
subject matter" in such manner so to be "clearly intended as a substitute." Second, United contends that the district court erred in admitting certain statistical evidence of the termination of minorities. But this
court found that statistics alone may be used to establish a prima facie
case of racial discrimination in a disparate treatment case. Third, United
argued that the court erred in failing to admit certain exhibits into evidence as they were admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule. Since
the balancing of their probative value against their potential of prejudice
is a discretionary decision for the trial judge, the decision will not be
overturned absent clear error.
Schwenke v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 858 F .2d 627
Schwenke appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment
entered in favor of defendant. At issue is whether defendant demonstrated the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Affirmed.
In January, 1985, Schwenke resigned from her position with the defendant and secured employment with one of the defendant's competitors, but reserved the right to confer with the defendant to determine if
whe would be considered for a supervisory position. During the subsequent selection process, Schwenke was among several applicants considered, but the position was awarded to Roy Baron based upon his
performance review, recommendations, educational background, and a
company policy to "promote from within" when possible. Schwenke, a
Polynesian, brought a civil rights action claiming she was denied the job
promotion because of her race. The district court concluded that the
defendant had a valid business purpose for offering the supervisory po-
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sition to Baron and did not discriminate against Schwenke. The court
also held that summary judgment in Title VII actions is appropriate
where the court identifies a suit as without merit.

